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The Internet and Social Media change our way of decision-making. We 
are no longer the independent decision makers we used to be. Instead, 
we have become networked minds, social decision-makers, more than 
ever before. This has several fundamental implications. First of all, our 
economic theories must change, and second, our economic institutions 
must be adapted to support the social decision-maker, the "homo 
socialis", rather than tailored to the perfect egoist, known as "homo 
economicus".  
 
The financial, economic and public debt crisis has seriously damaged our 
trust in mainstream economic theory. Can it really offer an adequate 
description of economic reality? Laboratory experiments keep questioning one 
of the main pillars of economic theory, the "homo economicus". They show 
that the perfectly self-regarding decision-maker is not the rule, but rather the 
exception [1,2]. And they show that markets, as they are organized today, are 
undermining ethical behavior [3]. 
 
Latest scientific results have shown that a "homo socialis" with other-
regarding preferences will eventually result from the merciless forces of 
evolution, even if people optimize their utility, when offspring tend to stay 
close to their parents [4]. 1  Another, independent study was recently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Experts should note that there has been research on so-called "altruistic behavior" in social dilemma 
situations such as the prisoner's dilemma since more than 3 decades. However, if scientists would have 
understood the "homo socialis" with other-regarding preferences already before, the key concept of 
the "homo economicus" should have disappeared from the economic literature since a long time, but it 
didn't for a reason. In fact, the increasing empirical and experimental evidence for fairness preferences 
and unexpectedly high levels of cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma, dictator and ultimatum 
games have been waiting for a convincing theoretical explanation until very recently. It is important here 
to distinguish between other-regarding preferences and cooperative ("altruistic") behavior. Other-
regarding preferences means that people intentionally do not maximize their own payoffs, but try to 
consider and improve the benefits of others. However, most game theoretical work is strictly compatible 
with the concept of "homo economicus", identifying mechanisms that make it advantageous in one way 
or another to cooperate. For example, if the "shadow of the future" in repeated prisoner's dilemma 
interactions is long enough, it creates a higher payoff when people cooperate, and that's why they do it. 
In other words, some mechanisms such as repeated interactions, punishment, transfer payments, and 
others change the payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma game such that there is no dilemma anymore. 
Martin Nowak has mathematically shown that many such mechanisms can be understood with 
Hamilton's rule, according to which people cooperate when the benefits of cooperation exceed the costs. 
Other work shows that cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games may survive if people imitate more 
successful behavior of neighbors, but if one believes in rational choice, why should people imitate, if 
they can reach a higher payoff by another behavior? In fact, all such cooperation in spatial prisoner's 
dilemma games disappears, if imitation is replaced by a "best response" rule, which assumes a strict 
maximization of utility, based on the previous decision of the interaction partners. In Ref. [4], Grund et al. 
have combined such a "best response" rule with standard evolutionary rules of mutation and selection, 
when people reproduce. The unexpected outcome was a "homo socialis", if offspring stay close to their 
parents, which they often do. But the transition does not happen automatically by itself. It requires the 
population to go through a phase where unconditionally "friendly" behavior is dysfunctional, which 
happens only by "mistake" (due to mutations). For other-regarding preferences to emerge, random 
spatio-temporal coincidence of people with friendly traits is also important. Remarkably, however, 
summarized by the statement "evolution will punish you, if you're selfish and 
mean" [5]. Is this really true? And what implications would this have for our 
economic theory and institutions? 
 
In fact, the success of the human species as compared to others results 
mainly from its social nature. There is much evidence that evolution has 
created different incentive systems, not just one: besides the desire to 
possess (in order to survive in times of crises), this includes sexual 
satisfaction (to ensure reproduction), curiosity and creativity (to explore 
opportunities and risks), emotional satisfaction (based on empathy), and 
social recognition (reputation, power). Already Adam Smith noted: "How ever 
selfish man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it."2  
 
The social nature of man has dramatic implications, both for economic theory 
and for the way we need to organize our economy. As we are more and more 
connected with others, the "homo economicus", i.e. the independent decision-
maker and perfect egoist, is no longer an adequate representation or good 
approximation of human decision-makers. Reality has changed. We are 
applying an outdated theory, and that's what makes economic crises more 
severe. 
 
Outdated theory, outdated institutions 
 
In fact, recent experimental results suggest that the majority of decision-
makers are of the type of a "homo socials" with equity- or equality-oriented 
fairness preferences [1,6]. The "homo socialis" is characterized by two 
features: interdependent decision-making, which takes into account the 
impact on others, and conditional cooperativeness. Note that the "homo 
socialis" takes self-determined, free decisions. However, in contrast to what 
we have today, the principle is not to encourage everyone to rip off others, 
and then afterwards to give back some of the individual benefits to those in 
need through taxes or philanthropy - as we know, this cannot overcome 
"tragedies of the commons" (see below).  
 
The "homo socialis" rather decides in a smarter way than the "homo 
economicus", recognizing that friendly and fair behavior can generate better 
outcomes for everybody than if everyone or every company is just thinking for 
himself. Interestingly, putting oneself into the shoes of others when taking 
decisions creates interdependent decisions, "networked minds". Such 
"networked minds" enable collective intelligence, i.e. they can take more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conditionally cooperative behavior resulting from other-regarding preferences may occur between 
strangers, i.e. they do not require genetic relatedness, as the following movie 
shows: http://vimeo.com/65376719. In any case, spatio-temporal correlations (here: the co-evolution of 
individual preferences and behavior) can promote cooperation more than expected for a payoff-
maximizing "homo economicus". These new discoveries mean that key concepts of economics 
must be reconsidered. 
2 Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments (A. Millar, London, 1759). 
3 This has many things in common with how Swiss-style basic democracy works. 
intelligent and better decisions than a single mind can do. 
 
However, other-regarding preferences are vulnerable to exploitation by the 
"homo economicus". In a selfish environment, the "homo socialis" cannot 
thrive. In other words, if the settings are not right, the "homo socialis" behaves 
the same as the "homo economicus". That's probably why we haven't noticed 
its existence for a long time. Our theories and institutions were tailored to the 
"homo economicus", not to the "homo socialis".   
 
In fact, some of today's institutions, such as homogeneous markets with 
anonymous exchange, undermine cooperation in social dilemma situations, i.e. 
situations in which cooperation would be favorable for everyone, but non-
cooperative behavior promises additional benefits [7, Fig. 2].  
 
New institutions for a global information society 
   
In the past we have built public roads, parks and museums, schools, libraries, 
universities, and global markets. What would be suitable institutions for the 
21st century? Reputation systems can transfer the success principles of 
social communities to our globalized society, the global village. Most people 
and companies care about reputation. Therefore, reputation systems could 
support socially oriented decision-making and cooperation, with better 
outcomes for everyone [8]. In fact, reputation systems spread on the Web 2.0 
like wildfire. People rate products, sellers, news, everything, be it at amazon, 
ebay, or trip adviser. We have become a "like it" generation, because we 
listen to what our friends like. 
 
Importantly, recommender systems should not narrow down socio-diversity, 
as this is the basis of happiness, innovation and societal resilience. We don't 
want to live in a filter bubble, where we don't get a good picture of the world 
anymore, as Eli Pariser has pointed out [9]. Therefore, reputation systems 
should be pluralistic, open, and user-centric. Pluralistic reputation systems are 
oriented at the values and quality criteria of individuals rather than 
recommending what a company's reputation filter thinks is best. Self-
determination of the user is central. We must be able to use different filters, 
choose the filters ourselves, and modify them. The diverse filters would mine 
the ratings and comments that people leave on the Web, but also consider 
how much one trusts in certain information sources.  
 
Reputation creates benefits for buyers and sellers. A recent study shows that 
good reputation allows sellers to take a higher price, while customers can 
expect a better service [10]. Reputation systems may also promote better 
quality as well as socially and environmentally friendly production. This could 
be a new approach to reach more sustainable production, based on self-
regulation rather than enforcement by laws. One day, reputation systems may 
also be used to create a new kind of money. The value of "qualified money" 
would depend on it's reputation and thereby create incentives to invest in 
ways that increase a money unit's reputation. It might create a more adaptive 
financial system and help to mitigate the recurrent crises we are facing since 
hundreds of years. But the details still have to be worked out. 
 
Benefits of a self-regulating economy 
 
Reputation systems could overcome some of the unwanted side effects of 
anonymous exchange thanks to pseudonymous or personal interactions. 
Thereby, they could potentially counter "tragedies of the commons" such as 
global warming, environmental exploitation and degradation, overfishing, ... - 
constituting some of our major unsolved global problems. We can witness 
such kinds of "social dilemma problems" everywhere. So far, governments try 
to fix them with top-down regulations and punitive institutions. However, these 
are very expensive, and often quite ineffective. Basically all industrialized 
countries suffer from exploding debts. In many countries, we cannot pay for 
this much longer, we are at the limit. We need a new approach. As Albert 
Einstein pointed out: "We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of 
thinking that created them."  
 
Institutions supporting the "homo socialis" such as suitably designed 
reputation systems would enable a self-regulation of socio-economic systems. 
But self-regulation does not mean that everyone can choose the rules he likes. 
It only works with an other-regarding element. The self-regulation rules must 
be able to achieve a balance between the interests of everyone, who is 
affected by the externalities of a decision.  
 
Other-regarding decisions can overcome the classical conflict between 
economic and social motives. Self-regulation could also overcome the 
struggle between the bottom-up organization of markets and the top-down 
regulation by politics. This would remove a lot of friction from our current 
system, making it much more efficient - in the same way as the transition from 
centrally planned economies to self-organized markets has often created 
huge efficiency gains.  
  
This can be illustrated with an example from urban traffic management. Traffic 
control is a problem where not everybody's desires can be satisfied 
immediately and at the same time, like in economic systems. It is a so-called 
NP-hard optimization problem - the computational effort explodes with system 
size, as for many economic optimization problems, e.g. in production and 
logistics. The study compares three kinds of control: A centralized top-down 
regulation by a traffic center, the classical control approach, and two 
decentralized control approaches. The first one assumes that each 
intersection independently minimizes the waiting times of approaching 
vehicles, as a "homo economicus" would do. The second one decides in an 
other-regarding way: it interrupts the minimization of waiting times, when this 
is needed to avoid spill-over effects at neighboring intersections. Summarizing, 
the "homo economicus" approach works well up to a moderate utilization of 
intersections, but queue lengths get out of control long before the intersection 
capacity is reached. The bottom-up self-regulation based on the principle of 
the "homo socialis" approach beats both, the centralized top-down regulation 
and the bottom-up self-organization based on principles of the "homo 
economicus". Other-regarding behavior improves the coordination among 
neighboring intersections. It makes the principle of the "invisible hand" work, 
even at high utilizations. 
 
 
 
Economics 2.0: Emergence of a participatory market society 
 
But will such a self-regulating system ever be implemented? In fact, this new, 
third kind of economy is already on its way. The Web 2.0, in particular 
reputation systems and social media are driving the transition towards an 
economy 2.0. We see already a strong trend towards decentralized, local 
production and personalized products, enabled by 3D printers, app stores, 
and other technologies. 
 
Such developments will eventually create a participatory market society. 
"Prosumers", i.e. co-producing consumers, the new "makers" movement, and 
the sharing economy are some examples illustrating this. Just think of the 
success of Wikipedia, Open Streetmap or Github. Open Streetmap now 
provides the most up-to-date maps of the world, thanks to more than 1 million 
volunteers. This is just the beginning of a new era, where production and 
public engagement will more and more happen in a bottom up way through 
fluid "projects", where people can contribute as a leaders ("entrepreneurs") or 
participants. A new intellectual framework is emerging, and a creative and 
participatory era is ahead. The paradigm shift towards participatory bottom-up 
self-regulation3 may be bigger than the paradigm shift from a geocentric to a 
heliocentric worldview. If we build the right institutions for the information 
society of the 21st century, we will finally be able to mitigate some very old 
problems of humanity. "Tragedies of the commons" are just one of them. After 
so many centuries, they are still plaguing us, but this needn't be. 
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3 This has many things in common with how Swiss-style basic democracy works. 
